

**His Excellency, Āyatullāh al-‘Uẓmā Jawādī Āmulī’s Message
to the Congress of PHILOSOPHICAL THINKERS**

In the Name of Allah, the All-beneficent, the All-merciful.

Perpetual praises are due to God Immaculate, Who is Pure Being and the being of every existent is His manifestation; endless salutations are in order upon God’s holy prophets, in particular the Seal of Prophethood, who are the best manifestations of the Lord; boundless benedictions are owing upon the Friends of the Creator, especially his Eminence, the Seal of Sainthood, the extant and promised Mahdī, who are the greatest signs of God the bestower of existence; we wish to near ourselves in friendship to these sacred souls and distance ourselves from their nefarious foes.

After a warm welcome to all the philosophical thinkers, especially the esteemed guests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we would like to thank the conveners and sponsors of this important congress. Furthermore, we would like to acknowledge the oration of those who benefited the participants with their speeches, as well as the composition of those who obliged the readers with their articles. It is to be hoped that the ultimate Reality of the realm of being, Who all seek the beatific vision of, or Whose qualities they desire mention of, in Whose way they serve and at Whose door they wait hand and foot, will free the modern world community from intellectual ignorance and practical caprice—guiding them towards the beauty of correct knowledge and the majesty of right discernment. At this juncture, it is opportune that a few points are presented to this eminent symposium so that perhaps they may in part be effectual in the philosophical researches of theorists as well as the mystical findings of visionaries.

First: Philosophy is given precedence and is commissioned with the leadership of all other sciences. This is because the scope of any science is defined by the breadth of its subject matter. Each and every one of the experimental, mathematical, or human sciences—such as law, psychology, sociology, and their like—are limited, but philosophy by virtue of the fact that it speaks of pre-eternity, post-eternity, and their aggregate, sempiternity, is broader in scope than these sciences. To explain, as all intelligible things are a part of the universe, the sciences associated with these things fall under the leadership of a science that is tasked with the understanding of the entire universe in all its immensity. As such, the affirming and positing of the existence of the subject of the sciences, as well as explicating their inhering causal order—something without which no science can take shape—are considered to be some of the substantial areas to which pure philosophy applies; hence the mandate of such a universal philosophy as the caravan-leader of the procession of sciences. If pure philosophy, which is responsible for the guidance of all other sciences, is free of errors, those sciences—which give shape to a pure civilization—are also protected from going awry. Now it is in reality the philosopher who is the wayfarer of this journey, and to the degree that he is sound, he will tread correctly on the path of philosophy which leads him to go from the self-evident to the theoretical and from the unknown towards the known. Hence the philosopher being free of any and all types of impairments and defilements is one of the most important factors in his correct understanding of the secrets of existence. This freedom from unfounded imagination and fantasy, as well as the emancipation from simplistic thinking and short-sightedness, is what separates philosophy from knowledge of particulars on the one hand, and delineates the greater scope of philosophy from second-order

philosophies¹ on the other. It follows from the above that any thinker who sees himself to be bound to the natural order and is unaware of the immateriality of his own spirit, can never have proper discernment of reality and even if such a person were to speak of philosophy, his thought would be anything but. A worm inside a wheat kernel has its own “ground” and its own “sky”; it knows nothing about the plant, the field, or the farmer, its horizons being limited to the inside of the kernel. Hence it exclaims:

مَا هِيَ إِلَّا حَيَاتُنَا الدُّنْيَا نَمُوتُ وَنَحْيَا وَمَا يُبَلِّغُنَا إِلَّا الدَّهْرُ

‘There is nothing but the life of this world: we live and we die, and nothing but time destroys us.’ (45:24)

Second: The divine philosophy is a particular worldview that sees possible propositions as deriving from necessary propositions, and the latter as being ultimately based in eternally [necessary] propositions; similarly it refers theoretic propositions to self-evident ones so as to make them as evident and as useful as they are. Eternal propositions are the most original source of knowledge and understanding; without these propositions, essentially necessary propositions are made vulnerable to error, and this is tantamount to the dissolution of all other propositions. With such a collapse of the founding pillars and demolition of the bases of cognition, the enterprise of [human] knowledge comes tumbling down. The divine philosophy protects this cognitive hierarchy and does not see the truth of eternally necessary propositions as deriving from any contingent being—such as the universal intellect, factuality, etc.—but rather sees it to be from its correspondence with the eternal knowledge of God. This latter knowledge is safe from the imperfection of contingency and is free of the defect of temporality, as per the impossibility of the coincidence of two contradictories—which lies at the root of all logical and philosophical analysis, to the extent that even the law of the excluded middle is explained, but not caused, by the law of contradiction. To enter into the realm of the nondelimited requires an expansive heart that is beyond temporal and spatial conditions and free of material limitations.

Fly back from hypocrisy, hasten towards Reason: how shall the wing of the phenomenal (unreal) soar to Heaven?²

By David iron is made (soft as) a piece of wax; in thy hand wax is (hard) as iron.³

In short, a lasting certainty with regards to reality is not possible without eternally necessary propositions. The affirmation of the latter is only possible by positing an eternally necessary existent such that one of Its essential qualities, i.e. eternal knowledge, is in correspondence to the eternally necessary propositions. Such an existent can only God, the nature of Whose existence is explicated by divine philosophy. In conclusion: 1) The existence of God all-eternal is the source and origin of all [‘other’] existents. 2) The knowledge of God all-eternal is the source of all certain knowledge (i.e. with respect to its existence, any given thing is supported by the existence of God, and with respect to its knowledge, it is based on His knowledge, which is identical to His Essence.

¹ Second-order philosophies are sometimes known as applied philosophies or compound philosophies and include most of those fields that start with the prefix, “philosophy of...” [Tr.]

² Reynold A. Nicholson, *The Mathnawī of Jalālūddīn Rumī* (Delhi: Adam Publishers, 1992), vol. 3, vr. 696.

³ Ibid, vol. 3, vr. 703.

Third: According to man's ability, pure philosophy is characterized by permanence, universality, and absoluteness. Thus, it can act as the criterion of truth and falsehood or the affirmation and negation of other sciences. This is because divine philosophy rejects the relativity of truth and affirms its objectivity; even though the awareness of individuals can be relative. The alteration of particulars that take place during the discovery of reality do not in any way tarnish the universal principles, and in fact even the general matters of those sciences given to change are not affected and remain the same. For instance, the law of causality which is one of the main subjects of divine philosophy (and as it is presented in this same philosophy) remains unchanged despite the manifold changes that take place in the chain of causes and effects as well as the alterations inhering during the process of acquiring their knowledge. Another example is the need of every motion for a mover, an origin, a destination, time-duration, displacement, and the object that is moved. So while it is true that enormous changes took place at the hands of some of the great scientists and mathematicians, for instance motion came down from the celestial spheres to the terrestrial realm, while stillness was seen to have left the earth for the heavens, the spell of a geocentric world was broken and a heliocentric perspective came to be universally accepted, despite all of these changes, no new development in the laws of motion as they are studied in transcendental philosophy was seen to take place. Neither Ptolemy's cosmology nor Copernicus' discoveries, nor that of any other scientist and mathematician, cause any changes to be made to the laws of motion, especially 'substantial motion'. In short, the general principles of divine philosophy are constant and stable, not 'immovable. Upheavals in time and space in no way harm either this stability nor do they affect the absolute nature of these principles by the influx of relativity. Pure philosophy being such a comprehensive science and having pre-eminence amongst other human teachings, is able to guide many other sciences such that they give rise to a pure civilization and procure the benefit of humanity at large. Such an ascendant science calls for being acquired and proliferated so that under its guidance all other sciences can take proper shape. Alas, pure intellectuality and certain demonstration are brighter than any sun or moon! For in the words of that great Iranian philosopher Mīr Muḥammad Bāqir Muḥaqqiqdāmād (d. 1041 hijri): "If the intellect were to be pictured and made tangible, the sun would be dark in comparison to it; and if ignorance were to be pictured and made tangible, darkness would be bright in comparison to it."⁴ Albeit, it must be stressed that approaching divine philosophy—which is the source of all stability and the origin of all metaphysical absoluteness—is a feat that is not in the capacity of all Wayfarers.

The towers on high should not be circled but by those of enlightened faces;

For detachment from the lower is not the task of those with lowly traces.⁵

Fourth: Pure philosophy divides the sciences into sacred and profane for the twofold reason that they all are preceded by this philosophy and because they are after-the-fact coloured by it. No science can remain indifferent with regards to being Islamic or un-Islamic, nor can it independently decide its relation to belief and disbelief, precisely because it is pure philosophy which must pass verdict on every science [lower than itself]. The only science that can be said to be self-sufficient in being sacred or profane is philosophy. Figuratively speaking, philosophy writes its

⁴ *Al-Ṣirāt al-mustaqīm*, p. 7.

⁵ *Diwān-e Shams-e Tabrīzī*, vr. 2550.

own destiny for itself. To explain, the written words of all books, [good or bad] derive from the Mother of the Book; the master scroll of pure philosophy is similar in that at its inception it is neither sacred nor profane, for at this point it has not properly delved into the question of whether there is an originator for the existential order or not? Nor has it asked whether existents are eternal and self-creating or the created effects of a wise and eternal creator? Hence before reaching its introspective maturity, philosophy is indifferent to both the sacred and the profane, even though with continued efforts it eventually gravitates to either this or that side of the question. If it goes awry and becomes blinded by the dust of the divergent dirt road, and thereby loses its capacity of envisioning, it does not perceive God, not even through a single aperture; the very God Who manifests Himself in countless ways for innumerable eyes. Such a philosophy no longer hears the intimate call of God and no longer receives His heartening message. It sees the world to be in vain, itself aimless, and others as pointless. It deems death to be the end of the road and sees death to be a mortification and not a morphosis; such a philosophy is profane and makes all sciences to become the same. This is because the sciences of the particulars are not mandated to either affirm or deny God, and in this important matter they take their lead from pure philosophy and become profane and atheistic. They continue in this vein and surmise their subjects to be also devoid of the divine, and suppose knowledge to be purely the construct of the human mind. As such their scope of knowledge becomes flattened and horizontal so that whether they are researching the earth or the sky, they investigate only the spatio-temporal shifts of existents, saying: this existent was previously in such and such a position, it is now so, and in the near or far future it will be in this or that state. They make no mention of the agent or efficient cause. In such a case there is no way whatsoever to consider such a science as “Islamic”, even though the person studying such a science might, due to a personal predilection, might be a monotheistic Muslim. On the other hand, if philosophy remains on the straight and narrow, if it does not swerve to the right or to the left, if it neither goes too fast nor too slow, if it remains upright, it sees God to be the Creator of all and sundry. Such a philosophy will sing in harmony with Firdawsī when he said, “I do not know what You are, whatever is existing is You”. That is to say, Your unknowable identity is the totality of all being and because being is simple and nondelimited—the former implies His indivisibility and the latter His unfathomability. It is because of this that our eminent teacher Imam Khumaynī (r) and similarly our eminent teacher ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī (r) held that it is impossible to have knowledge of the divine Essence and went on to posit that one can only have certainty of the fact that the concept of the absolute existent corresponds to its concrete referent without actually having access to that referent. In lieu of this, they invited the seeker of God to acquire the knowledge of His beautiful names and his sublime attributes without end, and went on to demarcate the path and its fruits. It is such a philosophy that has escaped from the multiplicity of the profane and has arrived at the divine pool of Unicity that can posit a wise Creator for the contingent order, holding the latter to be purposeful and knowing, death to be a migration from the terrestrial plane to the celestial—death itself being a shedding of the earthly and a donning of the imaginal; as such—and that has a firm standard with regards to all of its sciences, insights, methods, and cultivation. It is this celestial philosophy that sees the entirety of the subjects of all of the sciences to be nothing but the creations of God, and with great profundity and exactness knows the law of causality to be based on [the relationship between] the nexus or connexion and the independent—thereby witnessing the

apparel of divine creation and origination on the bodies of all contingent beings. Such a philosophy finds the freedom of human will to be one of the best bestowals of God to man, so that men, individually and collectively, can by their own choice traverse this terrestrial passageway and neither deviate from the path nor become obstacles for others. The sweet fruit of this tree of philosophy is that all sciences become Islamic. Based on this divine philosophy, all sciences, whether experimental, partially-experimental, intellectual, and mystical—or in common terms, the natural sciences, mathematics, theology, ethics and mysticism—become religious. This leads to the conclusion that there is no science, regardless of its place and time, that is not of divine inception and divine maintenance. That which is not correct science or knowledge was never born, nor will it ever come into existence. Surmising and conjecturing something to be knowledge and a science that is not so, does not make it so. The explanation of this will be taken up in point five below.

Fifth: If pure philosophy becomes divine, life becomes informed by authentic culture, mixed with true civilization, invigorated by justice and kindness while excluding bloodshed and insecurity. Because man is a being that lives by thinking and willing, and these two aspects cannot come about without knowledge—whether it is in the sense of knowing a fact such as a single proposition or it is in the meaning of a collection of subjects, issues, bases, and motives, such as compose a field of knowledge and sciences like medicine, astronomy, and so on—no science can be considered as Islamic without them. A ‘religious’ science is not just one in which one or more of its premises and propositions are mentioned in some holy book and that is supported by traditional and textual evidence, such as the Law and the science of jurisprudence. Rather, by the religious nature of a science something more general is meant than this particular meaning. The latter comprises of the fact that a proposition along with all of its attendant premises and corollaries are found in the sacred text in question and that the religious scholars engage in the study of the same, expanding on generalities and clarifying ambiguities, finding conditions for absolute statements, and resolving conflicts among them so as to lead to a resolution or ruling. The general meaning of a science being ‘religious’ lies in the fact that all things in the world, whether material or immaterial, real or conventional, that are based on reality, subsisting in actuality, or derived from objectivity, are the creation of God. In this manner, the existing order should more properly be called ‘creation’ rather than ‘nature’, and if the latter is ever mentioned it is to be referred to a substantive that is more real and goes by the name of ‘creation’. Hence the creation of God can be divided as so: some are natural, such as minerals, trees, stars; some are mathematical, such as numbers, lines, planes; and others are divine, such as revelation, prophethood, immaculateness, ... Now because every existent is a creation and act of God:

اللَّهُ خَلَقَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ

Allah is the creator of every thing. (39:62)

And knowledge is the explanation and explication of the known. Hence, every knowledge, whether it be a single proposition such as knowledge of a tree or a collection of inter-connected propositions such as the science of medicine, is actually the explanation and exegesis of the act of God. Furthermore, every method of acquiring knowledge, whether empirical or abstractive, or a combination of the two is a bounty and effusion of God from amongst his effusions:

عَلَّمَ الْإِنْسَانَ مَا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ

taught man that which He knew not. (96:5)

The explanation and exegesis of the act of God by way of an effusion from Him, through the medium of a thinker that is himself both a creature of God and a recipient of His effusion and a beneficiary of His grace, is something that is purely religious and is never un-Islamic. According to the criterion set by the pure divine philosophy, there is no such thing as a non-religious knowledge. Hence the incorrectness of the conclusion that because the distinction between the sciences comes from their differing subjects, premises, issues, or motivations, to distinguish between a religious science and a secular science, we must turn to one of these factors. What's more, from the perspective of the profane philosophy, there is no such thing as a religious science so as to then speak of distinguishing it from a non-religious science. This is because according to this way of seeing things, the very essence of religion is nothing but myth and fantasy. If there be a need to distinguish and make such a division at all then it must be made by comparing the sacred and divine philosophy from the profane and material. The former holds that an existent can be necessary or possible, immaterial or material, terrestrial or celestial, while the latter philosophy surmises that an existent can only be possible, material, and terrestrial. Epistemologically the latter is sensual and empirical while the former gives cognitive authority to intellection and abstraction alongside experimentation, and assents to the their role in the disclosure of reality. Hence, in the same way that the exegesis of sacred texts, which is the explanation of the speech of God, is properly Islamic, the 'exegesis' of the secrets of creation, which is the explanation of the acts of God, becomes exactly Islamic. The final word with regards to the sciences lies with pure philosophy. That which is dividable into religious and non-religious is the act of man. To explain, after coming to possess freewill and the freedom to accept or reject the truth from God, or to decide to tread on the right path or to go on the deviant road, it is correct to speak of man being religious or secular. This is also true of things which are the result of the applied sciences because these things are the work and act of man and can be likewise divided into belief and disbelief, goodness and badness, truth and falsehood and finally into justice and injustice. In short, the use of any particular 'science' can be irreligious but as was explained above, true and correct science that is effectively the explication of the acts of God can never be irreligious and can only be religious.

Sixth: Pure philosophy, like its subject which is the existential order imbued with eternity and ubiquity and qualified with universality and subsistence, is expansive. Every absolute and universal reality exists alongside its conditioned and particular individual, even though the conditioned and the individual are not with their absolute and universal. Hence a proposition whose premise is conditioned or an individual is true by necessity, but if this same proposition is reversed so that its premise becomes absolute and universal, the proposition will not be true unless the premise is changed by adding the word "some" or example. The reason for this is that the absolute and universal are united with the conditioned and the individual but the reverse does not hold true, except in particular cases. The effectuality and pertinence of pure philosophy in all of the sciences of the particulars lies in this that the thinker or scientist first acquires the general outlines and teachings of pure philosophy and then turns to this particular field of study. Thereafter, he witnesses the presence of the universal principles, without admixture, in all parts of the

science that he is engrossed with, such that he does not appraise any scientific matter without having seen it through his philosophical insight. But if he were to see things in a separative manner, then this would lead to the divorce of the conditioned from the absolute, effectively leaving the former as an orphan and cutting its connection from its lifeline. Such a cutting off is the kiss of death of any science and if it were to continue to progress, its progress would be futile. But if on the contrary such a science were to be inspired with that certain and absolute knowledge of pure philosophy, then the blessings of a divine worldview would become apparent in that science and would lead it to bear fruits. Such a science would soar on two wings, the first being the particular premises and bases of the particular science in question, and the second being the proximity of that science to pure philosophy. This is because the existential aspect of the particular science that has been benefited and inspired by pure philosophy would become more perfect, and would lead in turn to it taking further benefit from the universal principles of philosophy. An example of such a beneficial interaction can be found in the case of Mullā Ṣadrā (r). As he wrote in his profound commentary on the *Ilahiyyāt* of Ibn Sīnā, the latter's books are full of theology in its general sense. He did not mention Ibn Sīnā's treatment of the natural sciences at all. So while the issues of the creation of material objects, the substantial motion of bodies, and the soul that is the manager of the body are all matters of natural science according to many philosophers and not theological, nevertheless Mullā Ṣadrā surveys all of these matters from an ontological point of view and presents many [new] conclusions. The subject of revelation and prophethood of prophets, human civilization owing a great deal to the guidance of the latter, is discussed in the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā in two separate sections: Natural philosophy and theology. This is because he mentions the potential of the immaterial soul of man in acquiring sanctity and communion with the supernal intellects in the section of 'the knowledge of the soul' which was counted as one of the subjects of the natural sciences by the ancients. On the other hand he deals with the necessity of prophethood and the sending of prophets, the revelation of holy books in the section of 'theology'. But Mullā Ṣadrā broaches both of these subjects in pure philosophy. It is clear that his method is useful so long as the subject matter is not conditioned by its natural, mathematical, logical, or ethical conditions. Otherwise this method would not be effective. The reason why pure philosophy is absent from the scene in many sciences is that on the one hand philosophers do not take up these sciences, and on the other, the practitioners of those sciences do not have a good knowledge of pure philosophy. Moreover the combining of the two is not easy for scholars. It is because the scientists do not have any knowledge of the universal teachings of pure philosophy, they do not feel as if they owe anything to it. Hence, these sciences of the particulars have become separated from the universal principles of philosophy and are bereft from its bounties. What little they have taken from philosophy is due to the efforts of those self-conscious individuals who have harmoniously combined pure philosophy with the sciences. A philosophy that is distanced from the particularistic sciences in no way displays the leadership role of pure philosophy. The reason why Islamic sciences are also rejected by the sciences is that the work of science has fallen into the hands of those who are not representative of a harmonious combination between pure philosophy and particularistic science; as those who are unaware of the Alpha and Omega of the world, have cut their little package of knowledge from the origin and the end, rendering it aimless and seek from it nothing more than material benefits. The quintessential way for firstly, making pure philosophy more effective with respect to

the sciences, and secondly making it more practically useful, and thirdly, coming to see all true sciences to be Islamic is that the heads of those involved in the accumulation and systemization of knowledge should become wayfarers of the fourth journey, that is to say, the journey from the creation to the creation in Reality. If they do this they will see every existent to be God's creation and every science to be the exposition and exegesis of His acts, and finally they will come to acknowledge any and all types of knowledge of the secrets of the terrestrial and celestial realms—either by way of empirical inquiry, intellectual abstraction, a combination of the two ways, or by intuition of the heart—to be Islamic.

Seventh: Insofar as pure philosophy is mandated with the leadership of all other sciences, it outlines the way of preventing problems and misfortunes by way of certain sciences that are close to it and act as the regulator of the mind so as to safeguard it from errors of conception and judgment. Logic, like all the other discursive sciences, is indebted to pure philosophy and has the role of discerning errors and mistakes. It distinguishes between literal and semantic errors so that quasi-certainty may not take the place of certainty and conjecture the place of surety, and so that false arguments are not mistaken for true demonstrations. Hence both Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī passed the decree making the learning of the section of demonstration in logic obligatory; the other sections being recommended. This firm resolve led to the formation of the “five arts” and the separation of demonstration from rhetoric, polemics, poetics, and sophistry. It also shed light on the fact that there must be a necessary connection between the known and the unknown, and between the axiomatic and the speculative. This interdependency can only be of three types, this threefold restriction deriving from two factual disjunctive propositions, this is because a restricted logical division cannot occur without a real disjunction, nor does an exclusive disjunction have more than one prior and one consequent since, in a real disjunction, the prior and the consequent are contradictory, and each prior has only one consequent, that is to say, there is only one contradiction for each proposition. The medium between the unknown and the known is not asserted by “either,” such as is assumed, “the unknown is either subsumed under the known or not,” or else, “the known is either subsumed under the unknown or not.” In this latter case, both the known and the unknown are subsumed under a third universal, the first part being a deduction, the second part being a complete induction, and the third part an analogy such that its reversal would also be in reference to the deduction, otherwise it would be invalid. But if the induction does not refer back to the deduction, and does not lead to the universal which includes all the individuals, then the first argument will not lend itself to logical inference. Certainty, which is apodicticity of the affirmation of a logical predicate and apodicticity of the impossibility of the negation of the logical predicate, is just assumed through self-evident propositions leading to primary propositions. Self-evident propositions are demonstrable but do not need to be demonstrated. Primary propositions are those which are not at all demonstrable. Although there were some statistics provided in support of the propositions leading to certainty, there was no reason being offered for the restriction of those values to specific numbers.

Of course, the truth values of different types of argument are not the same; for example, in propositions based on experience, traditional premises, speculative propositions and the like, total certainty exists only for the subject of experience, transmission, and speculation. However, the principle of identity as an axiom,

which states that an object is the same as itself, is a demonstration to any intellectual. An argument devoid of the rules referred to cannot become invulnerable to fallacy, whether it is quasi certainty as in fallacy or be it equipped with psychological certainty instead of logical certainty, which, in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, has been referred to as the certainty of person who unusually and uncommonly is certain of most propositions, and such certainties have therefore been rejected by the said discipline and are not utilized in logical reasoning. An argument will also be vulnerable if it is only psychologically convincing, something that is only useful in the art of oration, although its effect is such that the majority of people interpret it as certainty, and it has its place in practical knowledge and apparently, its truth is a composition of logical estimation and psychological conjectured belief, which is taken as making up for the lack of an absolute standard. In such a depiction, assumption and speculation are taken as certainty. However, strong rules of logical inference will not allow any type of eclectic fallacy either.

Pure philosophy considers all existents to be either material or immaterial. Thus, it divides epistemology into sensational and rational, then the fields associated with epistemology open the way for sensation and intellectual abstraction. Similarly, the birth of speculative philosophy and practical philosophy is the result of philosophical discourse on absolute being leading to the division of actual being and mentally posited being.

Eighth: Islamic philosophy and even Islamic sciences in their general meaning, that is in their meaning of divine and religious, are to be contrasted with profane and irreligious, not with say “Christian” or similar terms. This is because there Islamic philosophy is not more than one, precisely because the religion of God is only Islam and is not more than one:

إِنَّ الدِّينَ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ الْإِسْلَامُ

Surely the religion with God is but Islam. (3:19)

It is not correct to take philosophy to be like jurisprudence which is mainly composed of the law and the way, which was different for every prophet.

لِكُلِّ جَعَلْنَا مِنْكُمْ شِرْعَةً وَمِنْهَاجًا

to each among you have we prescribed a law and an way. (5:48)

Hence it is not correct to ask about the difference inhering between Islamic philosophy and Christian philosophy, though it is possible that some of the words of Jesus (‘a) might have led some Christian philosophers to particular intellectual and philosophical findings, just as is the case with Muslim philosophers and the words of the Seal of the prophets (ﷺ) and the Immaculates (‘a) this is found in abundance. Nevertheless, all sublime teachings are by definition divine and Islamic and there is no philosophical matter, in any place or period, that is not Islamic; but if the matter at hand be profane, then in any city and in any time that it is found it is un-Islamic. Because all of the subjects of divine pure philosophy pertain to the universal being that is the act of God, all of its issues and propositions will be Islamic, i.e. divine in the universal and general sense. The evidence of this lies in the fact that from time immemorial it has been the common terminology of the practitioners of pure philosophy to call metaphysics, ‘theology in its general meaning’ and discussions about God and His attributes, ‘theology in its specific meaning’; because that which is discussed in divine pure philosophy is either the

existence of God, His attributes of essence, His attributes of act, His acts themselves, and the effects of his creation, and nothing else. The beginning and end of such a science will be nothing but Islamic. It must not be expected that a verse from the Qur'ān or a tradition must be brought to the fore and its contents discussed for the science to become Islamic. So in the same way that it is necessary to distinguish pure philosophy from secondary-philosophies and also to distinguish it from science in its contemporary meaning, it is also required that its being Islamic or religious is properly understood so that like Islamic jurisprudence it is not given a limited and particular meaning. A point to note is that because profane and materialistic philosophies are close to the philosophy of science and are not far from the contemporary meaning of "knowledge" or science, consequently many second-order philosophies have arisen from such a situation and many materialistic sciences as well. This is not the case with pure philosophy, as it has a comprehensive world view that includes the seen and the unseen, the empirical as well as the abstract and is far from the particularistic sciences. But the necessity of interaction between philosophy and the sciences call for divine sages and philosophers to lower the level of their expositions, and for the scientists to not enter into any discussions without taking aid from philosophical principles and using its primary propositions. For while the possibility of the divorce and separation of science from religion is weak, the possible danger that would ensue makes it demand attention.

At the end of this message we would like to once again welcome the presence of all philosophical thinkers that have come to Iran the land of philosophy and the nurturer of philosophers. While the Greek had the honour to have such figures as Plato and Aristotle, among others, yet everyone in the Middle East was amongst the students of the Abrahamic prophets, because before Abraham the breaker of idols, they were either polytheists or atheists.

If it were not for the efforts of Ahmad, you too would have worshiped idols like your forefathers.⁶

From the viewpoint of the Qur'ān and the Family, Islamic Iran has had the honour to be at the leading edge of the divine school of Abraham, hence Nizami wrote:

The whole world is a body and Iran is its heart,
We are not at all hesitant in making this claim;
As Iran is the heart of the earth,
Know that the heart is better than the body.

We would like to thank the respected conveners of this eminent conference.

May the Peace and Mercy of Allah be upon you.

Jawādī Āmulī
Ābān 1389 AHS

⁶ *Mathnawī*, p. 85.